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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of board composition and firm valuation as a 
function of board composition in Taiwan — a country that features relatively weak 
protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders, and pyramidal groups.  The 
results suggest that there is poor governance when the board is dominated by members who 
are affiliated with the controlling family but good governance when the board is dominated 
by members who are not affiliated with the controlling family.  In particular board 
affiliation is higher when negative entrenchment effects — measured by (1) divergence in 
control and cash flow rights, (2) family control, and (3) same CEO and Chairman — are 
strong and lower when positive incentive effects, measured by cash flow rights, are strong. 
 Moreover, relative firm value is negatively related to board affiliation in family-controlled 
firms.  Thus, the proportion of directors represented by a controlling family appears to be 
a reasonable proxy for the quality of corporate governance at the firm level when investor 
protection is relatively weak and it is difficult to determine the degree of separation 
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This paper examines the determinants of board composition and firm valuation as a 
function of board composition in Taiwan — a country that features relatively weak 
protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders, and pyramidal groups.  The 
results suggest that there is poor governance when the board is dominated by members who 
are affiliated with the controlling family but good governance when the board is dominated 
by members who are not affiliated with the controlling family.  In particular board 
affiliation is higher when negative entrenchment effects — measured by (1) divergence in 
control and cash flow rights, (2) family control, and (3) same CEO and Chairman — are 
strong and lower when positive incentive effects, measured by cash flow rights, are strong. 
 Moreover, relative firm value is negatively related to board affiliation in family-controlled 
firms.  Thus, the proportion of directors represented by a controlling family appears to be 
a reasonable proxy for the quality of corporate governance at the firm level when investor 
protection is relatively weak and it is difficult to determine the degree of separation 
between ownership and control. 
 
   Commitment or Entrenchment?:  Controlling Shareholders and Board Composition 
 
1.  Introduction 
Is corporate board structure indicative of corporate governance in firms with 
concentrated ownership?  Does shareholder concentration allow controlling shareholders 
to select board members that are more likely to monitor or provide expertise?  Or does 
shareholder concentration allow controlling shareholders to select board members that 
enable them to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders?  Does the independence of 
the board appear to matter in firms with concentrated ownership? These are important 
questions that have not been fully addressed in the literature.  Existing studies on corporate 
boards of directors are generally restricted to large U.S. firms with disperse ownership and 
generally treat board composition as exogenous (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003, for a 
survey).  It remains an open question whether results in existing studies can be generalized 
to firms with controlling shareholders.   
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) argue that understanding how directors are chosen 
is crucial to understanding the roles the board can play and how effectively it can play them. 
 Existing studies suggest CEOs wield major influence in selecting new board members 
when ownership is disperse (Mace, 1971; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Shivdasani and 
Yermack, 1999).
1   Moreover, Shivdasani and Yermack find that when CEOs are involved 
in selecting directors, they choose directors who are less likely to monitor.  However, 
several recent studies suggest that ownership tends to be more concentrated and agency 
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1 The average (median) CEO ownership in Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) is 2.7% (0.4%). problems tend to be more severe in countries with weaker investor protection (e.g., La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999 and 2000).    
On the one hand, concentrated ownership arises when investor protection is weaker 
to help solve the managerial agency problem because controlling shareholders have the 
power and incentive to discipline management (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1988).  On the 
other hand, concentrated ownership creates the conditions for a new agency problem 
because the interests of controlling and minority shareholders are not perfectly aligned, 
especially when there is a divergence between control and ownership (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 
2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002).  In such instances, corporate boards 
could play an important role in limiting the power of controlling shareholders to 
expropriate the interests of minority shareholders by ratifying and monitoring important 
decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  However, board composition is likely to be influenced 
by controlling shareholders in such instances.  Therefore, a firm’s board structure could 
serve as an important indicator of whether the controlling shareholder is committed to 
good corporate governance or is entrenched.  
Taiwan represents an ideal setting to examine these issues because it features 
relatively weak protection of minority shareholders, high ownership concentration, a 
predominance of family control, and an abundance of pyramidal groups and 
cross-holdings—characteristics common to many countries (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; and Faccio and Lang, 2002).
2  In this environment, it 
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2 According to La Porta et al. (1998), only three of six legal rights designed to protect shareholders are 
included in Taiwan’s Law. The inclusion of three shareholder rights is weak compared to both the inclusion 
of five shareholder rights in the Law for the U.S. and the average inclusion of four shareholder rights in the 
Law for common law countries.  However, the average inclusion in La Porta et al.’s sample when civil law 
countries are included is three.    may be difficult for minority investors to determine whether positive incentive or negative 
entrenchment effects dominate.  The use of pyramidal groups and cross-holdings makes it 
easy for large shareholders to separate ownership and control and difficult for minority 
investors to detect the degree of separation.  Thus, a firm’s board structure may be viewed 
as a strong indicator of the controlling shareholder’s commitment to corporate governance, 
especially in weaker investor protection countries.  Controlling shareholders may select 
board members that are more likely to both monitor and provide professional expertise 
when the positive incentive effects of ownership are high.  In this situation, controlling 
shareholders would gain more from increasing shareholder wealth than they would lose in 
foregoing expropriation.  In contrast, controlling shareholders may select board members 
that are less likely to monitor and more likely to support their decisions in order to entrench 
themselves further when the entrenchment effects of excess control outweigh the positive 
incentive effects of cash flow ownership.  In this situation, the net personal benefit of 
expropriation is greater than the net personal benefit of shareholder wealth maximization.  
We examine the determinants of board composition and firm valuation as a 
function of board composition in Taiwan.  We carefully identify the ownership and control 
structures for a sample of Taiwanese firms to measure the positive incentive and negative 
entrenchment effects of the controlling shareholder.  Specifically, we use cash flow rights 
to measure positive incentive effects and the divergence between cash flow and control 
rights to measure negative entrenchment effects.   We find that the fraction of board 
members affiliated to a firm’s largest shareholder is higher when that shareholder: (1) has 
a greater divergence in control and cash flow rights, (2) is a member of the controlling 
family, and (3) is the firm’s CEO and chairman.  We also find that family-controlled firms 
  3have lower firm value when the fraction of board members affiliated to the controlling 
family is higher.  These results suggest that controlling shareholders do wield influence 
over board member selection and that corporate boards are good indicators of a firm’s 
governance structure when ownership is concentrated, protection of minority investors is 
relatively weak, and determining the degree of separation between ownership and control 
is difficult (i.e., the controlling shareholder is a family).  In particular, boards that are 
closely linked to controlling families are associated with strong, negative entrenchment 
effects, and firms with these board structures are valued less by investors.  In contrast, 
boards that are independent of controlling families are associated with strong, positive 
incentive effects, and firms with these board structures are valued more highly by 
investors.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the 
corporate governance environment in Taiwan.  Section 3 describes the sample and 
provides summary statistics.  Section 4 presents the empirical analysis.  Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  Corporate governance in Taiwan 
 
Several internal and external governance mechanisms in the U.S. — such as 
ownership by institutions, the market for corporate control, and the composition of the 
board of directors — may provide incentives for managers to maximize shareholder wealth. 
 However, the degree to which these mechanisms come into play can vary dramatically 
across countries.  For example, Yeh, Lee, and Woidtke (2001) find that Taiwanese listed 
  4companies have similar ownership characteristics to publicly traded companies in most 
countries around the world.  They are characterized by a high degree of ownership in 
general and are predominantly family-controlled (see La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang, 2000; and Faccio and Lang, 2002 for ownership characteristics in 
countries around the world).  However, unlike the U.S., Taiwan is characterized by low 
institutional ownership and an inactive market for corporate control.  Moreover, 
stockholders have fewer rights in Taiwan than in the U.S., though they have approximately 
the same number of rights as the average reported for 49 countries in La Porta et al. (1998). 
Thus, Taiwan provides a natural setting for examining the influence of positive incentive 
and negative entrenchment effects on board composition.  Our results are more likely to be 
indicative of the board’s role in most countries than results using U.S. firms, not only 
because large shareholders are more likely to play an important role in director selection 
but also because alternate corporate governance mechanisms are less likely to play as 
critical a role in countries where family control is predominant.     
2.1.  Corporate boards in Taiwan 
Similar to German boards, corporate boards in Taiwan are comprised of two 
separate organizations—a board of directors and board of supervisors.  Directors are 
responsible for managing the company, while supervisors are responsible for monitoring 
the directors.  Specific director responsibilities include the following:  managing business 
operations; appointing, dismissing, and compensating management; appointing, 
dismissing, and compensating external auditors; legally representing the company within 
the limits of their authority; and approving equity and debt issues.  Managerial decisions 
  5within a firm are determined by the vote of its directors during board meetings.  The 
minimum number of directors required by law for our sample of Taiwanese firms is three. 
On the other hand, supervisors do not participate in the decision-making or the 
voting process but are designated to monitor the board of directors.  They are responsible 
for scrutinizing decisions made by directors, reviewing and auditing the reports provided 
by directors, and resolving any disputes arising between shareholders and directors.  The 
supervisors are to oversee business operations and can investigate a firm’s finances or 
operations at any time.  Moreover, supervisors can individually exercise their rights.  A 
consensus is not required.  For example, a single supervisor can require directors or 
managers to address any question or concern (s)he has regarding the company’s operations 
or financial statements.  If the supervisor finds the directors or managers have either 
transgressed the law or hurt firm value, (s)he can sue the directors or managers.  Because 
supervisors can individually exercise their rights, Taiwanese companies tend to have a 
small number of supervisors.  The minimum requirement by law for our sample of 
Taiwanese firms is one supervisor.   
Unlike German boards, Taiwanese boards of directors and supervisors are parallel 
organizations.  In other words, supervisors do not have the right to approve directors’ 
decisions.  Even though they may ask managers or directors to address questions, directors 
and managers have some influence over what information is given to supervisors.  Thus, a 
lawsuit is unlikely unless a supervisor is willing to actively monitor and investigate 
directors’ or managers’ actions.  Moreover, Taiwan’s Corporate Law stipulates that both 
supervisors and directors are to be elected by shareholders and only current shareholders 
are qualified candidates, but the regulations do not stipulate that independent directors or 
  6independent supervisors must be included on a corporation’s board.
3   Even though 
Taiwan’s Corporate Law stipulates that no current employees or directors can serve as 
supervisors, it does not prohibit family members of current employees or directors from 
serving as supervisors.  As a result, it is common to see family members of controlling 
shareholders serve as supervisors.
4  In addition, because Taiwan’s Corporate Law allows 
institutional shareholders to elect representatives to the board, controlling families have 
the ability to increase their influence over the board by creating nominal investment 
companies that in turn become institutional shareholders in the company. 
2.2.  Positive incentive versus negative entrenchment effects 
La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), and Faccio and Lang 
(2002) find that controlling shareholders of publicly traded firms in most countries 
typically have significant control in excess of their cash flow investment.  When large 
shareholders have control in excess of their cash flow rights, they might try to expropriate 
wealth by seeking personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.
5  Consistent 
with this view, Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) find that a greater divergence in 
control rights and cash flow rights is associated with lower firm value.  Given the latitude 
controlling shareholders in Taiwan have in selecting both directors and supervisors, they 
can strengthen their control by selecting family members or persons they trust as both 
                                                           
3 Taiwan’s Corporate Law relaxed the restriction that directors and supervisors be firm shareholders at the 
end of 2001, and the Taiwan Stock Exchange began requiring that IPO firms listing from January 2002 on 
include two independent directors and one independent supervisor on the board.  Security Exchange Law also 
increased the minimum requirements in 2001 to be 5 directors and 3 supervisors for newly listed companies.  
4 The only limitations regarding corporate boards in Taiwan are:  (1) terms for both directors and supervisors 
are three years; (2) the board must be comprised of at least three directors and one supervisor; and (3) 
directors and supervisors must be selected separately. 
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5 See Grossman and Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1997),  La Porta et al. (1999), 
Wolfenzon (1999), and Bebchuck et al. (2000).  directors to make decisions in their favor and as supervisors to not question those decisions. 
  
Controlling shareholders may alternatively commit to increase shareholder wealth 
by selecting professional managers to serve as directors based on their expertise rather than 
affiliation.  Similarly, they may commit to limit expropriation by selecting supervisors that 
are more likely to monitor.  When cash flow investment is high or divergence in control 
rights and cash flow rights is low, the benefit controlling shareholders receive from 
increasing shareholder wealth increases relative to their loss from limiting expropriation.  
In this situation, controlling shareholders may select professional managers without family 
ties or independent supervisors to increase shareholder wealth.  Semkow (1994) examines 
excessive nepotism and finds that firms are filling senior management and board positions 
with non-family professionals demonstrating traditional “structural family” characteristics 
instead of family members incapable of maintaining and enhancing the business left by the 
founder.  In addition, Yeh, Lee, and Woidtke (2001) find a positive valuation effect in a 
sample of Taiwanese firms when controlling families hold less than 50% of a firm’s board 
seats.  Finally, Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2002) and Bhoraj and Sengupta (2002) find 
that independent boards are associated with lower costs of debt financing, suggesting that 
independent directors serve a certification role for firms.
6   
To the extent that controlling shareholders commit to limit expropriation (entrench 
themselves further) through selecting unaffiliated (affiliated or family) board members, we 
                                                           
6 Existing studies in the U.S. provide mixed support for the role of independent directors.  For example, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find a positive market reaction to the addition of outside directors; and Byrd, 
Fraser, Lee, and Williams (2002) find that thrifts surviving the thrift crisis had more independent directors 
than those that failed.  On the other hand, Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Mehran (1995), and Bhagat and Black (2001) find no significant correlation between the fraction of 
  8expect a negative (positive) relation between the fraction of affiliated board members and 
measures of positive incentive effects (negative entrenchment effects).   
 
3.  Sample and summary statistics 
 
The sample includes non-financial companies publicly listed in Taiwan in 1998.  
The board composition, control rights, and cash flow rights data are collected from 
company prospectuses and "Business Groups in Taiwan," a book published annually by the 
China Credit Information Services LTD.  Other company information is collected from the 
Taiwan Economics Journal (TEJ) database.  Complete data are available for 251 
companies or about 71% of all non-financial companies publicly listed in Taiwan.
7  We 
take the 1998 year-end value for each company. A summary of variable names and 
definitions are presented in Table 1, and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.  
3.1 Ownership versus control 
Data on both the cash flow rights and voting rights are required to measure the 
divergence between ownership and control.  Following the concept of ultimate control in 
La Porta et al. (1999), the ownership of a family group rather than the ownership of a single 
person serves as the unit of analysis where the family group is defined as a group of people 
that are related through blood or marriage ties.  As in Claessens et al. (2000), we calculate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
independent directors on a firm’s board and either accounting or long-term stock performance. 
  9
7 Because company prospectuses are needed to calculate both cash flow and control rights and companies 
only issue a prospectus when they issue new equity or corporate bonds, we are unable to calculate these 
measures for 29% of the non-financial companies in 1998.  However, the industry distribution is similar 
between our sample and the population of listed non-financial companies; and the average market 
capitalization value (book value of assets) for our sample is not significantly different from that for the 
population. ownership based on cash flow rights and control based on voting rights.  We therefore 
carefully trace the chain of ownership and use pyramiding schemes and cross-holdings to 
distinguish between cash flow rights and voting rights.  We define the controlling 
shareholder as the shareholder or family group found to have the largest control rights 
when summing direct and indirect voting rights.     
Ultimate owners of Taiwanese listed companies often enhance their control rights 
through nominal investment companies and other entities. We thus identify both nominal 
investment companies and other entities founded by ultimate owners and companies under 
the same business group from “Business Groups in Taiwan,” a news database of listed 
companies and company prospectuses. Unfortunately, some of these nominal investment 
companies and other entities are private companies; and hence, the complete ownership 
structure is not available.  In these situations, we assume that the ultimate owners and the 
companies they control put up 50% of the capital for these nominal investment companies 
when calculating cash flow rights.  We also use 0% and 100% when calculating cash flow 
rights and get similar results. 
Take the Formosa Plastics Group as an example.  The diagram for Formosa Plastics 
in Figure 1 illustrates the complexity of calculating cash flow and control rights separately 
when cross-holdings and pyramids are used.  Following the methodology in Claessens et 
al. (2000), direct voting rights are based on the proportion of shares registered to the 
ultimate owner, and indirect voting rights are based on the weakest link in the chain of 
shares held by entities that are in turn controlled by the ultimate owner.
8  Yung-Ching 
Wang is the founder of Formosa Plastics, and the Wang family directly owns 21.47% of 
  10Formosa Plastics’ shares.  As can be seen in Figure 1, two non-profit organizations 
controlled by the Wang family (Chang Gung University and Chang Gung Hospital) and 
two other publicly-listed companies controlled by the Wang family (Nan Ya Plastics and 
Formosa Chemicals and Fiber) also own shares in Formosa Plastics.  We therefore 
calculate the Wang’s control rights to be 33.05%, which equals 21.74% (the Wang 
family’s direct control) + min[20.45%, 4.07%] (the weakest link in the chain of control 
through Na Ya Plastics) + min[32.17%, 4.72%] (the weakest link in the chain of control 
through Formosa Chemicals and Fiber) + min[100%, 2.52%] (the weakest link in the chain 
of control through the Chang Gung organizations).  In contrast, the cash flow rights in 
Formosa Plastics are calculated to be 24.09%, which equals 21.74% (the Wang family’s 
direct cash flow rights) + 0.2045*4.07% (the Wang family’s portion of Na Ya Plastics’ 
cash flow rights) + 0.3217*4.72% (the Wang family’s portion of Formosa Chemicals and 
Fiber’s cash flow rights) + 0.0*2.52% (the Wang family controls but has no claim to cash 
flow rights in the Chang Gung organizations). 
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Chang Gung University 
Chang Gung Hospital 
Formosa Chemicals and 
Fiber 
Nan Ya Plastics Formosa Plastics 
The Wang Family 
   
(1) The Chang Gung University and Chang Gung Hospital were built up by the donations of the Wang family. 
The Wang family therefore has much influence over the two nonprofit organizations. However, because the 
Wang family’s influence derives from donations, they have no claims to the organizations’ cash flows. 
(2) The Wang family directly owns 21.74% of Formosa’s shares, 20.45% of Nan Ya Plastics’ shares, and 
32.17% of Formosa Chemicals and Fiber’s shares, respectively. These shares include the shares owned by the 
family members and the shares owned by the Chin’s International Investment Co. and Wan-Shoon 
International Investment Co., both founded by the Wang family. These two investment companies are 100% 
founded by the Wang family, so we include the shares owned by the two investment companies as direct 
shareholding. 
 




  12Panel A in Table 2 presents measures of ownership and control for the sample.  
Ownership is defined as the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder.  Control is defined 
as the voting rights of the largest shareholder as described above.  Excess Control is 
defined as Control less Ownership, and Ownership/Control is the ratio of ownership to 
control for the largest shareholder.  Similar to ownership patterns in many other countries, 
ownership is concentrated, and the largest shareholder has control rights in excess of cash 
flow rights.  Average ownership in the sample is 21.7% while average control is 30.3%.  
The difference results in excess control of 8.6% and an ownership/control ratio of 71.3% 
on average.  However, some variation exists in the divergence measures.  For example, 
Excess Control (Ownership/Control) is 0.0% (1.00) or there is no divergence at the 25
th 
(75




3.2.  Board composition 
We define board affiliation with respect to a company’s controlling or largest 
shareholder to examine whether the positive incentive and negative entrenchment effects 
for the controlling shareholder appear to influence the board selection process.  Even 
though board affiliation is not specifically defined with respect to management, Claessens 
et al. (2000) find that management in approximately 80% of Taiwanese listed firms is from 
the controlling family.  Board seats, including both directors and supervisors, are classified 
as affiliated when they are held either by the firm’s largest shareholder, by the largest 
shareholder’s identifiable relatives
9, or by legal representatives from other companies or 
entities controlled by the largest shareholder.  In the few instances when the controlling 
  13shareholder is the government or a widely held corporation, the delegates appointed to the 
board by the government or widely held corporation are classified as affiliates of the 
controlling shareholder.  We analyze board composition using three different measures of 
affiliation.  Control-affiliated directors is defined as the number of affiliated directors 
divided by the total number of directors.  Control-affiliated supervisors is defined as the 
number of affiliated supervisors divided by the total number of supervisors.  Finally, Full 
supervisor affiliation is a dummy variable that equals 1 when Control-affiliated 
supervisors equals 100% and equals 0, otherwise.  Since supervisors can act on an 
individual basis, we include both Control-affiliated supervisors and Full supervisor 
affiliation to see whether the fraction or simply the existence of an unaffiliated supervisor 
appears to be important.  
Referring back to Formosa Plastics.  The Wang family is the controlling family of 
Formosa Plastics, and they occupy 3 of 17 director seats.  Legal representatives of the 
Chang Gung Memorial Hospital and Nan Ya Plastics Corporation, legal entities and 
corporations founded and controlled by the Wang family, additionally hold 2 of 3 board 
supervisor seats.  Thus, Control-affiliated directors would be 18%, Control-affiliated 
supervisors would be 67%, and Full supervisor affiliation would be 0 for Formosa Plastics. 
   Panel B in Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for board composition in our 
sample of Taiwanese companies.  The average number of directors is 8, and the average 
number of supervisors is 2.  The average (median) values for Control-affiliated directors 
and Control-affiliated supervisors are both similar and range from 47% to 53%.  Note that 
33% of director seats are affiliated at the 25
th percentile compared to 0% of the supervisor 
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9 The identifiable relatives refer to spouse, parents, children, siblings, mother-in-law, father-in-law, sons and seats.  On the other hand, 100% of the supervisors are affiliated at the 75
th percentile 
compared to approximately 70% of directors.  Table 2 shows that 25% of the sample has 
full supervisor affiliation.   
We create two dummy variables to indicate (1) whether the largest shareholder 
exerts control through both the company and the board and (2) whether another large 
shareholder with some influence may exist.  Controlling shareholders that occupy upper 
level management positions and serve as chairman of the board are able to both set the 
agenda for meetings and direct discussions.  The lack of separation between these positions 
could therefore mitigate monitoring by others and be detrimental to other shareholders.  
For example, Pi and Timme (1993) find a positive association between separation of these 
roles and bank performance.  Similarly, Byrd, Fraser, Lee, and Williams (2002) find that 
failed thrifts during the thrift crisis were more likely to have a joint CEO-chairman.  In 
contrast, Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) argue that the practice would not be so 
widespread among U.S. firms if it undermined shareholder wealth and suggest that the 
costs of information sharing and lack of succession planning more than offset any 
monitoring benefits from keeping the posts independent.  Consistent with this view, Baliga, 
Moyer, and Rao (1996) find no evidence that separation of CEO and chairman posts 
provides benefits.  To examine the potential for entrenchment through joint posts, the CEO 
and chair dummy is set equal to 1 when the largest shareholder serves as both general 
manager and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise.  The largest shareholder holds both 
posts in approximately 48% of the sample. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
daughters-in-law, brothers and sisters-in-law. 
  15Finally, a second large shareholder sitting on a company’s board may mitigate the 
conflict of interest arising from a separation of ownership and control.  We therefore set 
Second large shareholder dummy equal to 1 when a shareholder unaffiliated to the largest 
shareholder owns more than 5% and holds a board seat in a company and 0, otherwise.  
Approximately 24% of the firms in our sample have another large shareholder with some 
influence on the board. 
3.3.  Other firm characteristics 
Panel C of Table 2 includes control variables and firm value.  Yeh, Lee, and 
Woidtke (2001) argue that a controlling shareholder can effectively gain control with 
lower levels of ownership as ownership concentration decreases.  To the extent that 
ownership among minority shareholders becomes more widely dispersed as a firm ages 
and grows larger, controlling shareholders’ effective control, and thus, influence over 
board member selection might increase.  We therefore include the natural log of both a 
firm’s age and its total book value of assets as additional factors that may influence board 
composition.  Average (and median) firm age for the sample is 26 years with a standard 
deviation of 10.65 years.  Average (median) size is NT $16.4 ($8.3) billion.   
Klein (1998) finds that boards of large U.S. firms have more outside directors with 
business relations when information needs of a firm are higher.  To the extent that 
controlling shareholders select professional managers as board members for information 
and advisory services, firms with higher information needs may have fewer 
control-affiliated board members.  We use the proportion of sales spent on R&D and 
advertising as a proxy for information needs.  R&D and advertising expenses are 2.1% 
(1.2%) of sales on average (for the median firm).    
  16Past firm performance may additionally influence board composition.  Semkow 
(1994) finds that promotion of descendants within the corporate ranks dilutes the pool of 
non-family talent and leads to corporate failure when family members are not capable of 
maintaining and enhancing the business left by the founder.  Consequently, family 
members are not promoted to senior management or board positions unless they have 
gained extensive experience first.  In contrast, non-family individuals with professional 
training are filling these positions because of their demonstration of traditional family 
values, such as trust, loyalty, and predictability.  In addition, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988), Gilson (1990), and Kaplan and Minton (1994) find that board structure changes 
and more outside directors are appointed after poor past performance.  We therefore 
include a firm’s Prior 5-year performance, or average EBIT/Assets for the previous 5-year 
period, as an additional control. 
We measure firm value using both Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets (ROA).
10  
Because the replacement cost of assets is not available from the Taiwan Stock Exchange, 
we follow La Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002) and calculate Tobin’s Q as the 
sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of 
assets.  We measure ROA as after-tax earnings before interest divided by total assets.  We 
calculate Leverage as total debt divided by book value of total assets.  The sample has an 
average Tobin’s Q of 1.75, and average ROA of 5.8%, and an average debt ratio of 41.5% 
 
 
                                                           
10 Tobin’s Q is widely used as a measure of firm value (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; McConnell 
and Servaes, 1990; Lang and Stulz, 1994; and Cho, 1998).  Return on assets (ROA) or profit rates are 
common alternative measures of performance (e.g., Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Morck et al., 1988; Kang 
  174.  Empirical Results 
 
4.1.    Ownership structure and board composition 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients between the two proportional 
measures of board affiliation.  Director affiliation and supervisor affiliation are positively 
correlated at the 1% significance level with a coefficient of 0.53.  The correlation 
coefficients between board affiliation and factors potentially influencing board 
composition are presented in Panel B of Table 3.  Both measures of board affiliation are 
positively correlated with Excess Control and negatively correlated with 
Ownership/Control.  For example, the correlation coefficient between Control-affiliated 
directors (%) and Excess Control (Ownership/Control) is 0.29 (-0.26).  These correlations 
suggest that controlling shareholders use their influence to select directors that are more 
likely to make decisions in their favor and supervisors that are less likely to monitor as the 
divergence between their control rights and cash flow rights increases.  We also find that 
board affiliation is higher when controlling shareholders assume both management and 
chairman roles.  
The different measures of board affiliation are each negatively correlated to the 
corresponding measures of board size, prior performance, the presence of a second large 
shareholder, and the proportion of sales spent on R&D and advertising.  Thus, boards 
appear to be less affiliated when new positions are added, when another large shareholder 
is present, and when firms have higher information needs.  However, board affiliation is 
greater in Taiwanese firms experiencing poor prior performance.  In contrast to the 
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and Shivdasani, 1995; and Qi et al., 1998). prediction that firms with poor performance would be more likely to assign a larger 
proportion of unaffiliated board members, the negative correlation suggests that greater 
board affiliation is a proxy for entrenchment.  Finally, both measures of board affiliation 
are positively correlated with firm age, but only supervisor affiliation is positively 
correlated with firm size.  These results suggest that controlling shareholders increase their 
control in older firms through selection of both affiliated directors and supervisors, but that 
they increase their control in larger firms through the selection of supervisors alone. 
To examine the effect of divergence in control and ownership further, we divide the 
sample according to whether controlling shareholders’ voting rights exceed their 
ownership or cash flow rights.  We then compare the individual components of divergence, 
control and ownership, and board affiliation across the two sub-samples.  The results are 
presented in Table 4.  Control exceeds ownership in 188 firms and is equal to ownership in 
63 firms.  In other words, a divergence in cash flow and control rights is present in 75% of 
the firms.  Controlling shareholders in both sets of firms control around 30% of the firm’s 
voting rights, on average, but controlling shareholders in firms with a divergence only own 
19% of the firm’s cash flow rights.  Thus, the divergence appears to be the result of 
maintaining control while decreasing ownership.  Moreover, both measures of board 
affiliation are higher for firms with a divergence.  When control exceeds ownership, over 
50% of both directors and supervisors are affiliated.  In contrast, when control equals 
ownership, less than 50% are affiliated.  The largest difference appears in supervisor 
affiliation.  Fifty-three percent of supervisors are affiliated in the divergent set, but only 
28% are affiliated in the non-divergent set.  In fact, 32% of divergent firms have full 
supervisor affiliation but only 5% of non-divergent firms have full supervisor affiliation.  
  19Taken together, these results suggest that controlling shareholders in divergent firms may 
use their influence over board selection to actually increase control or further entrench 
themselves as ownership declines.     
Table 5 presents values according to the degree that control exceeds ownership.  For 
example, Excess Control equals 0% when the largest shareholder controls 30% of a firm’s 
votes and owns 30% of its cash flows, but Excess Control equals 10% when the largest 
shareholder controls 30% of a firm’s votes but owns only 20% of its cash flows.  Excess 
Control is greater than 0% and less than 10% for the majority of firms.  For this group of 
firms, ownership is 19.4%, and it comprises 76% of the controlling shareholder’s voting 
rights, on average.  Director affiliation is greater than 50%, but supervisor affiliation is 
slightly less than 50%.  Approximately 28% of these firms have full supervisor affiliation.  
Ownership generally decreases and all three measures of board affiliation increase 
as Excess Control increases.  For example, ownership decreases from 29.6% to 17.4%, and 
director affiliation increases from 40.2% to 68.6% as excess control increases from 0% to 
greater than 30%.  Moreover, around 44% of firms with excess control greater than 30% 
have full supervisor affiliation compared to only 5% of firms with no excess control.  
Taken together, the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that stronger negative entrenchment 
effects are associated with the selection of affiliated board members, and stronger positive 
incentive effects are related to the selection of unaffiliated board members.  
  20  Taiwan is predominantly family-controlled, a characteristic of most countries with 
concentrated ownership  (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 
2002).  As in the case of Formosa Plastics, detecting the degree of separation between 
ownership and control may be particularly difficult in family-controlled companies 
because of the difficulty in tracing the complex pyramids and cross-holdings used by 
families to leverage their control.  We therefore present ownership characteristics 
separately for firms controlled by families and for firms controlled by non-families to see 
if controlling families influence boards differently than other controlling shareholders in 
Table 6.  Following La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), and Faccio and Lang 
(2002), a firm is classified as being controlled when the largest shareholder controls at least 
20% of the firm’s voting rights.  A 20% requirement results in 180 of 251 firms being 
classified as controlled firms.  Of these, 150 or 83% are controlled by a family, and 30 are 
controlled by another type of large shareholder.  
Both groups control slightly less than 40% of a firm’s voting rights, on average.  
However, family ownership is significantly smaller than non-family ownership.  Families 
own 25.5% of a firm’s cash flow rights, resulting in excess control of 12.8% on average.  
In contrast, non-families own 37.2% of a firm’s cash flow rights, resulting in excess 
control of only 2.1% on average.  Because of the larger degree of separation and perhaps 
more difficulty in tracing the separation in family-controlled firms, the incentive and 
entrenchment effects may be more pronounced in these firms.   
Table 6 shows that 59.7% (54.2%) of directors (supervisors) are affiliated with the 
controlling family in family-controlled firms, but only 46.3% (43.3%) of directors 
(supervisors) are affiliated with the controlling shareholder in other control firms on 
  21average.  In addition, 31% of family-controlled firms have full supervisor affiliation, 
compared to only 7% of other-controlled firms.  With the exception of control, the 
difference in means is significant for all variables.  Thus, the divergence in control and 
cash flow rights appears to occur primarily in family-controlled firms, and the majority of 
board members are affiliated with or belong to the controlling family in these firms.  In fact, 
31% of family-controlled firms have no unaffiliated supervisors in place to monitor its 
board of directors.  On the other hand, very little divergence between control and cash flow 
rights exists in other control firms, and the majority of board members are unaffiliated with 
the controlling shareholder in these firms.  Moreover, more than 93% of these firms have 
at least one unaffiliated supervisor in place to monitor their directors.  These univariate 
results suggest the entrenchment effects are more pronounced in family-controlled firms, 
which is the predominant type of firm with a controlling shareholder in the countries 
studied by La Porta et al. (1999). 
4.2.  Determinants of board composition 
We examine the relation between ownership structure and board composition 
further using a multiple regression framework to analyze the importance of both ownership 
 and control structures as determinants of board composition once we control for other 
factors.  The dependent variable is either Control-affiliated directors or Control-affiliated 
supervisors.  Because it is not clear whether the fraction or simple existence of unaffiliated 
supervisors is more important, we also conduct a logistic regression with Full supervisor 
affiliation as the dependent variable.  We separately include Ownership, 
Ownership/Control, Excess Control and a Divergence dummy in four specifications to 
measure different aspects of a firm’s ownership structure.  The results are qualitatively 
  22similar across the different measures of ownership and control.  For the sake of brevity, we 
only report the results using Ownership since it directly measures the positive incentive 
effect and Ownership/Control since it best measures the positive incentive effect relative to 
the entrenchment effect of the controlling shareholder.   
Given the predominance of family control in most countries and the different 
univariate results we find for family-controlled firms, we include a Family-control dummy, 
which equals 1 when a firm has a controlling shareholder that is a family and 0, otherwise. 
 Furthermore, the Family-control dummy is interacted with the ownership and control 
measures to see if incentive and entrenchment effects influence board composition 
differently for family-controlled firms.  Finally, we include indicators both of whether the 
controlling shareholder is CEO and chairman and of whether a second large shareholder 
has influence in addition to measures of board size, prior performance, firm size, firm age, 
and firm information needs.  The results are presented in Table 7.   
Consistent with earlier results, director affiliation and supervisor affiliation (full 
supervisor affiliation) are both significantly higher (is more likely) in family-controlled 
firms than in other firms when a separate measure of divergence in cash flow and control 
rights is not included.  However, no significant difference is found for family-controlled 
firms in the specification including a direct measure of divergence, the Ownership/Control 
ratio.  Instead, a significant, negative relation is only found between board affiliation and 
the Ownership/Control ratio.  Thus, divergence may be greater in family-controlled firms 
because it is easier for families to retain their control, but the actual divergence in 
ownership and control  appears to be more important in determining board affiliation than 
whether the controlling shareholder is a family.        
  23All aspects of board affiliation are positively related to whether the largest 
shareholder is both general manager and chairman of the board, but are negatively related 
to board size.  In particular, director affiliation appears to decrease as the number of 
directors increases, and the likelihood of electing an unaffiliated supervisor appears to 
increase as the number of supervisors increases.  Little evidence is found suggesting a 
second large shareholder significantly influences board affiliation.  Finally, board 
affiliation is negatively related to prior performance and positively related to firm age, and 
supervisor affiliation is positively related to firm size. 
  These results suggest that both ownership and control structure are important 
determinants of board composition in firms characterized by concentrated ownership.  In 
particular, controlling shareholders appear to select a higher proportion of affiliated board 
members, both supervisors and directors, as their control increases relative to their 
ownership both through higher voting rights and holding both CEO and Chairman posts; 
and this divergence is greater in family-controlled firms.  The negative relation between 
board affiliation and past performance is also consistent with controlling shareholders 
entrenching, or protecting, themselves through exerting greater influence over the board.  
However, controlling families appear to select more non-family members to commit to 
increase shareholder wealth or limit expropriation when their ownership or cash flow 
rights increase.   
  The significant, negative coefficient for the Ownership/Control ratio in Table 7 
suggests that increased board affiliation is associated with stronger, negative entrenchment 
effects as measured by divergence in ownership and control.  To examine the interaction 
between negative entrenchment and positive incentive effects in more detail, we 
  24disentangle the entrenchment and incentive effects by replacing the Ownership/Control 
ratio with Excess Control alone and interact Excess Control with three dummy variables 
indicating increasing levels of ownership in Table 8.  Recall that Excess Control is the 
amount by which control rights exceed cash flow rights.  Ownership>10%, 
Ownership>20%, and Ownership>30% are each dummy variables set equal to 1 when 
ownership or cash flow rights exceed 10%, 20%, and 30%, respectively, and set equal to 
0, otherwise.  Therefore interacting Excess Control with the different ownership dummies 
should allow us to see at what level of ownership the negative entrenchment effects 
associated with Excess Control is diminished by the positive incentive effects associated 
with higher levels of ownership.  Table 8 presents results for both the whole sample and the 
sub-sample of family-controlled firms.  Consistent with the results in Table 7, both 
measures of board affiliation increase as excess control increases.  This is true for both the 
entire sample and the family-controlled sub-sample.  Moreover, Ownership>30%*Excess 
control has a significant, negative coefficient similar in value to Excess Control, indicating 
that the negative entrenchment effects associated with excess control are offset by the 
positive incentive effects of ownership when ownership is greater than 30%.  This relation 
is particularly strong with respect to director affiliation.  The results for full supervisor 
affiliation in the logistic regressions are similar but are not as significant.  One way to 
interpret these results is that, on average, the costs associated with expropriating wealth 
from minority shareholders through the appointment of family members or controlled 
company representatives as employees and directors outweigh the potential benefits when 
ownership exceeds 30%.  We examine the relation between board composition and firm 
value in the next section.   
  254.3.  Board composition and firm value 
  The results in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that the negative entrenchment and positive 
incentive effects for controlling shareholders are important determinants of board 
composition.  We compare firm value between firms with different degrees of board 
affiliation in order to further examine patterns of board affiliation and whether board 
affiliation is negatively related to firm value.  Firms are grouped according to the degree 
of director and supervisor affiliation using 20% increments.  Panel A presents the average 
Tobin’s Q, the average ROA, and number of firms in each range for family-controlled 
firms.  Panel B presents the same for the remaining sample firms.  P-values are also given 
for the difference in mean Tobin’s Q (ROA) for firms in the 80%-100% director 
(supervisor) affiliation range and mean Tobin’s Q (ROA) for firms in each of the other 
ranges.  
 Only 7 (5%) firms have director affiliation between 0 and 20% compared to 25 (17%) 
that have director affiliation between 80 to 100% in the family-controlled sample.  In 
contrast, 16 (16%) firms have director affiliation in the lowest range, but only 9 (9%) firms 
have director affiliation in the highest range in the sample of firms that are not 
family-controlled.  The difference in number of firms between the lowest and highest 
ranges according to supervisor affiliation is less pronounced in the family-controlled firms 
but is more pronounced in the other firms.  Thirty-five (23%) firms have supervisor 
affiliation in the 0 to 20% range compared to 47 (31%) in the 80 to 100% range in the 
family-controlled sample.  On the other hand, 41 (41%) firms have supervisor affiliation in 
the 0 to 20% range compared to only 16 (16%) in the 80 to 100% range in the other firms. 
  
  26Overall, both Tobin’s Q and ROA tend to decrease as director affiliation increases for 
both family-controlled and other firms.  However, this pattern is not significant for firms 
that are not family-controlled.  In contrast, average Tobin’s Q for firms in the lowest range 
of director affiliation, is significantly greater than average Tobin’s Q for firms in the 
highest range of affiliation for the family-controlled sample.  Similarly, ROA is 
significantly higher for all sub-groups of family-controlled firms with director affiliation 
less than 60% when compared to those with director affiliation greater than 80%. 
Consistent with the results for director affiliation, both Tobin’s Q and ROA are 
significantly higher for firms with supervisor affiliation less than 80% when compared to 
firms with supervisor affiliation greater than 80%.
11  Unlike the results for director 
affiliation, the difference is significant for both family-controlled and non 
family-controlled sub-samples.  Furthermore, beyond the 80% cutoff, performance does 
not increase monotonically with each decrease in supervisor affiliation as it did with 
director affiliation.  For example, both Tobin’s Q and ROA is lower for firms with 
supervisor affiliation between 0% and 20% than for those with supervisor affiliation 
between 20% and 40%.  These results suggest that (1) director affiliation is more closely 
related to firm performance in family-controlled firms, but supervisor affiliation is related 
to firm performance in both family-controlled and non family-controlled firms and (2) the 
degree of director affiliation or director votes is important, but the degree of supervisor 
affiliation is less important than the existence of at least one unaffiliated supervisor since 
supervisors can act independently.    
                                                           
11 We also compare firms with 100% supervisor affiliation to firms with at least one unaffiliated supervisor 
and find similar results. 
 
  27To examine whether the negative relation between firm value and board affiliation 
persists once we control for other factors that may affect firm value, we conduct a multiple 
regression analysis in Table 10.  Similar to Woidtke (2002), we measure relative firm value 
with industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, or a firm’s Q less the average Q for all firms with the 
same industry classification code according to the Taiwan Stock Exchange.  We measure 
a firm’s industry-adjusted ROA in the same manner.  Because we are particularly 
interested in the relation for family-controlled firms, the Family control dummy is included 
and interacted with measures of board affiliation.  Consistent with the results in Table 9, 
relative firm value is significantly related to director affiliation and full supervisor 
affiliation in firms that are family-controlled.  Relative firm value is only marginally 
related to proportional supervisor affiliation in family-controlled firms and not 
significantly related to affiliation for non family-controlled firms.  The negative 
coefficients for both director affiliation and full supervisor affiliation interacted with the 
Family-control dummy suggests that relative firm value decreases as director affiliation 
increases or when 100% of the supervisors are affiliated in family-controlled firms.
12  
Taken together with the results for board composition, these results are consistent with 
negative entrenchment effects being associated with a larger proportion of affiliated 
members being appointed as board members, which in turn is associated with negative 
valuation effects when it is difficult to determine the degree of divergence, or in 
family-controlled firms.   
 
                                                           
12 These results are based on the inference that the separation of the controlling shareholder’s ownership 
from control determines their influence over board selection, which in turn affects firm value.  As a robustness 
check, we use a Three Stage Least Squares model to test these interactions.  Our results are robust to this 
simultaneous equations framework.  
  285. Conclusion 
 
We examine whether a firm’s corporate board is indicative of its corporate 
structure in an environment where ownership is concentrated, investor protection is 
relatively weak, and determining the degree of separation of ownership and control is 
difficult.  Existing studies indicate that ownership structures tend to be concentrated in 
most countries outside the U.S.  Yet studies on corporate boards of directors are generally 
restricted to large U.S. firms, where investor protection is strong and ownership is disperse, 
and treat board composition as being exogenous.  Our results suggest that controlling 
shareholders influence the board selection process, and a firm’s board structure is 
indicative of the quality of its corporate governance when ownership is concentrated, 
investor protection is relatively weak, and determining the degree of separation between 
ownership and control is difficult.  In particular, boards that are closely linked to 
controlling families are associated with strong, negative entrenchment effects or larger 
agency problems, and firms with these board structures are valued less by investors.  In 
contrast, boards that are independent of controlling families are associated with strong, 
positive incentive effects or smaller agency problems, and firms with these board 
structures are valued more highly by investors.     
    These findings have important implications for potential investors.  Existing studies 
of firms with concentrated ownership structures primarily use the divergence between 
control and ownership as a measure of the agency conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders.  However, the divergence measure can be difficult for investors to calculate 
accurately, especially when families use pyramids and cross-holdings to leverage control. 
  29 It is also possible that effective board oversight could mitigate agency conflicts in these 
situations.  The results in this paper, however, suggest that controlling shareholders 
entrench themselves further by selecting both board members that are more likely to make 
decisions favoring controlling shareholders and those that are less likely to monitor when 
divergence is higher.  Moreover, the resulting increase in board affiliation is associated 
with negative valuation in family-controlled firms.  In sum, our results are consistent with 
larger agency conflicts and weaker corporate governance existing when the majority of 
directors and all of the supervisors belong to the controlling family.  In contrast, a minority 
of affiliated directors and at least one unaffiliated supervisor appear to indicate smaller 
agency conflicts and stronger corporate governance.  Thus, board affiliation seems to be a 
reasonable proxy for the degree of agency conflicts in family-controlled firms.   
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  33Table 1.  Summary of variable definitions 
 
Definitions are given for variables used in the paper.  Data on ownership, control, and 
board structure are obtained from company prospectuses and “Business Groups in 
Taiwan.”  Data on other firm characteristics are obtained from the Taiwan Economics 
Journal database. 
  
Variable name  Definition 
Number of directors  The total number of directors 
Number of supervisors  The total number of supervisors 
Control-affiliated 
directors 
The number of directors affiliated with the largest shareholder group divided 
by the total number of directors 
Control-affiliated 
supervisors 
The number of supervisors affiliated with the largest shareholder group 
divided by the total number of supervisors 
Full  supervisor  affiliation A dummy variable that equals one when 100% of the supervisors are 
affiliated with the largest shareholder group and equals zero, otherwise.  
Second large shareholder 
dummy 
A dummy variable that equals one when a second shareholder owns more 
than 5% and equals zero, otherwise 
CEO  &  chair  dummy  A dummy variable that equals one when the largest shareholder group 
members serve both as the chairman of the board and general manager and 
equals zero, otherwise 
Control  The proportion of shares or votes controlled by the largest shareholder group
Ownership  The proportion of shares or cash flow rights owned by the largest 
shareholder group 
Excess Control   Control less ownership (i.e., the divergence between control rights and cash 
flow rights) 
Ownership/Control   The ratio of ownership to control 
Divergence dummy  A dummy variable that equals one when excess control is positive and 
equals zero, otherwise 
Prior 5-year performance  An average of a firm’s EBIT/Total assets for the previous five years (from 
1992 to 1996) 
Total assets  Book value of total assets (millions) 
Firm age  1998 less the year a firm was founded 
R&D and advertising 
intensity 
The ratio of R&D and advertising expenditures over sales 
Leverage  A firm’s total debt divided by total assets 
Tobin’s Q  A firm's market value of equity plus its book value of debt, all divided by 
total assets 
ROA  A firm’s net income plus interest expense*(1-tax rate), all divided by total 
assets 
Adjusted Industry Firm 
Value (Performance) 
A firm's Tobin's Q (ROA) less the average Tobin’s Q (ROA) for firms in the 
same industry according to the Taiwan Stock Exchange's industry 
classification. 
Ownership>10%  A dummy variable that equals one when Ownership is greater than 10% and 
equals zero, otherwise 
Ownership>20%  A dummy variable that equals one when Ownership is greater than 20% and 
equals zero, otherwise 
Ownership>30%  A dummy variable that equals one when Ownership is greater than 30% and 
equals zero, otherwise 
  34Table 2.  Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented for a sample of 251 Taiwanese firms for the year 1998.  Panel A presents 
measures of ownership and control where ownership is the proportion of cash flow rights owned and control 
is the proportion of voting rights controlled by the largest shareholder group.  Panel B provides descriptive 
statistics on board structure.  Control-affiliated directors (supervisors) is the number of directors (supervisors) 
affiliated with the largest shareholder group divided by the total number of directors (supervisors).  Full 
supervisor affiliation is a dummy variable that equals one when 100% of the supervisors are affiliated with the 
largest shareholder group and equals zero, otherwise.  Second large shareholder dummy equals one when a 
second shareholder owns more than 5% and equals zero, otherwise.  Panel C includes firm characteristics.  
Data on ownership, control, and board structure are obtained from company prospectuses and “Business 
Groups in Taiwan.”  Data on other firm characteristics are obtained from the Taiwan Economics Journal 
database.  Complete variable definitions are given in Table 1.  
  
Variables Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Quartile 1  Median  Quartile 3 
A. Ownership and control 
Control (%)  30.33  16.26  15.89  30.84  41.20 
Ownership (%)  21.68  14.99  8.58  19.47  31.40 
Excess control (%)  8.66  9.61  0.00  5.16  14.50 
Ownership/Control (%)   71.30  26.28  50.07  75.83  100.00 
B. Board structure 
Number of directors  8.19  4.18  5  7  9 
Number of supervisors  2.07  0.94  1  2  3 
Control-affiliated directors (%)  52.83  24.82  33.33  48.53  71.43 
Control-affiliated supervisors 
(%)  46.88 37.86  0.00 50.00  100.00 
Full supervisor affiliation (%)  25.00  44.00  0.00  0.00  100.00 
Second large shareholder dummy  0.24  0.43  0  0  0 
CEO & chair dummy  0.48  0.50  0  0  1 
C. Firm characteristics  
Total assets  16393.55 24296.12  4405.19  8272.89  17712.32 
Firm age  25.99  10.65  17  26  32 
R&D and advertising intensity 
(%)  2.05 2.83  0.20  1.16  2.74 
Prior 5-year performance (%)  10.27  6.38  6.52  9.88  12.98 
Tobin’s Q  1.75  0.85  1.21  1.50  1.97 
ROA (%)  5.79  9.04  1.38  5.78  10.74 
Leverage (%)  41.50  15.35  30.51  41.31  51.10 
  35Table 3.  Correlation matrix for board composition and other firm characteristics 
 
Pearson correlation coefficients between different measures of board affiliation are listed 
in Panel A and between measures of board affiliation and other firm characteristics are 
listed in Panel B.  P-values are given in parentheses.  Control-affiliated directors 
(supervisors) is the number of directors (supervisors) affiliated with the largest shareholder 
group divided by the total number of directors (supervisors).  Ownership is the proportion 
of cash flow rights owned and control is the proportion of voting rights controlled by the 
largest shareholder group.  Second large shareholder dummy equals one when a second 
shareholder owns more than 5% and equals zero, otherwise.  Data on ownership, control, 
and board structure are obtained from company prospectuses and “Business Groups in 
Taiwan.”  Data on other firm characteristics are obtained from the Taiwan Economics 
Journal database.  Complete variable definitions are given in Table 1.  P-values are given 
in parentheses.  ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.      
 
Variables Control-affiliated  directors Control-affiliated 
supervisors 
A. Board composition     
Control-affiliated directors  1  --- 
Control-affiliated supervisors  0.5340 
(0.000)***  1 
B. Board composition and 
other firm characteristics    








Number of directors  -0.2967 
(0.0001)***   
Number of supervisors    -0.1083 
(0.0863)* 





























  36Table 4.  Comparison between firms with and without a divergence in control and 
ownership 
 
Measures of ownership, control, and board affiliation are presented separately for firms 
with and without a divergence in control and ownership.  Ownership is the proportion of 
cash flow rights owned and control is the proportion of voting rights controlled by the 
largest shareholder group.  Control-affiliated directors (supervisors) is the number of 
directors (supervisors) affiliated with the largest shareholder group divided by the total 
number of directors (supervisors).  Full supervisor affiliation is a dummy variable that 
equals one when 100% of the supervisors are affiliated with the largest shareholder group 
and equals zero, otherwise.  Divergence equals 1 when a firm’s largest shareholder has 
control rights in excess of their cash flow rights and equals 0, otherwise.  Data on 
ownership, control, and board structure are obtained from company prospectuses and 
“Business Groups in Taiwan.”  Data on other firm characteristics are obtained from the 
Taiwan Economics Journal database.  ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 












for difference in 
means 








57.13 40.21  Control-affiliated 
directors (%)  (24.80) (20.30) 
5.43*** 
 
53.09 28.65  Control-affiliated 
supervisors (%)  (38.11) (30.75) 
5.15*** 
 
31.91 4.76  Full supervisor 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Table 6. Comparison between ownership, control, and board affiliation of 
family-controlled firms and other-controlled firms 
   
Average values of both ownership and control variables and board affiliation variables are 
presented separately for family-controlled firms and other-controlled firms.  Ownership is 
the proportion of cash flow rights owned and control is the proportion voting rights 
controlled by the largest shareholder group.  Control-affiliated directors (supervisors) is 
the number of directors (supervisors) affiliated with the largest shareholder group divided 
by the total number of directors (supervisors).  Full supervisor affiliation is a dummy 
variable that equals one when 100% of the supervisors are affiliated with the largest 
shareholder group and equals zero, otherwise.  A firm is defined as a family-controlled 
(other-controlled) firm if the largest shareholder is a family (non-family) controlling at 
least 20% of a firms control rights.  Data on ownership, control, and board structure are 
obtained from company prospectuses and “Business Groups in Taiwan.”  Variable 
definitions are given in Table 1.  Standard deviations are given in parentheses.  ***, **, * 










for difference in 
means 
















59.7 46.3  Control-affiliated  
directors (%)  (23.6) (16.2) 
3.80*** 
 
54.2 43.3  Control-affiliated  
supervisors (%)  (37.9) (27.2) 
1.85* 
 
31.3 6.7  Full supervisor 
 affiliation (%)  (46.5)  (25.4)  4.08*** 
 
  39Table 7.  Determinants of board affiliation 
 
The results of a multiple regression analysis of the determinants of board affiliation are presented where the 
dependent variable is a measure of board affiliation and the independent variables include measures of family 
control, ownership and control, board size, and other firm characteristics.  Control-affiliated directors 
(supervisors) is the number of directors (supervisors) affiliated with the largest shareholder group divided by 
the total number of directors (supervisors).  Full supervisor affiliation is a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
100% of the supervisors are affiliated with the largest shareholder group and equals 0, otherwise in a logistic 
regression framework.  Family control dummy equals 1 if the largest shareholder is a family controlling at 
least 20% of a firms control rights and equals 0, otherwise. Ownership is the proportion of cash flow rights 
owned and control is the proportion of voting rights controlled by the largest shareholder group.  Second large 
shareholder dummy equals 1 when a second shareholder owns more than 5% and equals 0, otherwise.  Data 
on ownership, control, and board structure are obtained from company prospectuses and “Business Groups in 
Taiwan.”  Data on other firm characteristics are obtained from the Taiwan Economics Journal database.  
Complete variable definitions are given in Table 1.  T- (Wald Chi-square) values are given in parentheses (for 
the logistic regression). ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.      
Variables Control-affiliated  directors Control-affiliated 
supervisors 
Full supervisor affiliation 
logistic regression 


























Ownership  0.32 
(2.31)**    0.55 
(2.32)**    -0.53 





(-3.89)***    -0.92 
(-2.94)***   -2.03 
(1.11)   
Ownership/ 
Control     -0.19 
(-2.21)**    -0.32 






  -0.04 
(-0.34)    0.06 







(-5.95)***     
Number of 


























































































2   0.40 0.40 0.24 0.25     
%  Concordant       85.9  87.1 
  40Table 8.  Negative entrenchment versus positive incentive effects on board affiliation 
The results of a multiple regression analysis of determinants of board affiliation including interactions of 
variables used to proxy for entrenchment and incentive effects are presented separately for the full sample and 
the sub-sample of family-controlled firms.  A firm is defined as a family-controlled firm if the largest 
shareholder is a family controlling at least 20% of a firms control rights.  The dependent variable is a measure 
of board affiliation, excess control proxies for entrenchment effects, and dummy variables indicating whether 
ownership exceeds 10%, 20%, or 30% proxy for different levels of incentive effects.  Control-affiliated 
directors (supervisors) is the number of directors (supervisors) affiliated with the largest shareholder group 
divided by the total number of directors (supervisors).  Full supervisor affiliation is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 when 100% of the supervisors are affiliated with the largest shareholder group and equals 0, 
otherwise in a logistic regression framework.  Excess control is control less ownership where ownership is the 
proportion of cash flow rights owned and control is the proportion of voting rights controlled by the largest 
shareholder group.  Second large shareholder dummy equals 1 when a second shareholder owns more than 
5% and equals 0, otherwise.  Data on ownership, control, and board structure are obtained from company 
prospectuses and “Business Groups in Taiwan.”  Data on other firm characteristics are obtained from the 
Taiwan Economics Journal database.  Complete variable definitions are given in Table 1.  T- (Wald 
Chi-square) values are given in parentheses (for the logistic regression). ***, **, * represent significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.      




























































































(-5.76)***     -0.02 
(-3.98)***    
Number of 
supervisors    -0.04 
(-1.64) 
-1.20 






















































































2  0.404  .236  .354  .206  
%  Concordant     86.5     85.3 
  41Table 9.  Firm value and performance across different ranges of board affiliation 
 
Average firm values, measured using Tobin’s Q and ROA, are presented for different groups of 
sample firms where firms are grouped according to their degree of board affiliation using three 
definitions of board affiliation.  Tobin’s Q is equal to a firm's market value of equity plus its book 
value of debt, all divided by total assets.  ROA is equal to a firm’s net income plus interest 
expense*(1-tax rate), all divided by total assets.  Control-affiliated directors (supervisors) is the 
number of directors (supervisors) affiliated with the largest shareholder group divided by the total 
number of directors (supervisors).  Panel A includes values for family-controlled firms, and Panel 
B includes values for firms that are not family-controlled.  A firm is defined as a family-controlled 
firm if the largest shareholder is a family controlling at least 20% of a firms control rights.  Data on 
ownership, control, and board structure are obtained from company prospectuses and “Business 
Groups in Taiwan.”  Data on other firm characteristics are obtained from the Taiwan Economics 
Journal database.  T-values for the difference in means between each group and the group of firms 
with board affiliation in the 80% to 100% range are given in parentheses.  ***, **, * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.    
 
Control-affiliated directors  Control-affiliated supervisors 
Board  affiliation 
range 
Tobin’s Q  ROA  n  Tobin’s Q  ROA  n 
A. Family-controlled firms 
0~20%  2.26 
(2.11)** 
8.55 
(1.92) * 7  1.79 
(2.40)** 
4.71 
(1.01)  35 
20%~40%  1.75 
(0.96) 
6.21 
(1.68) * 32  2.06 
(3.19)*** 
8.90 
(2.19) **  15 
40%~60%  1.83 
(1.60) 
6.56 
(2.07) ** 47  1.77 
(2.62)** 
6.36 
(2.02) **  43 
60%~80%  1.44 
(-0.88) 
4.52 
(1.22)  39  1.62 
(1.19) 
6.46 
(2.22) **  10 
80%~100% 1.56  2.23  25  1.44  2.28  47 
B. Other firms (non family-controlled firms) 
0~20%  2.08 
(1.17) 
7.29 
(1.36)  16  1.91 
(1.95)* 
7.48 
(2.52) **  41 
20%~40%  1.91 
(1.01) 
7.37 
(1.43)  39  1.97 
(1.42) 
7.85 
(2.38) **  16 
40%~60%  1.73 
(0.35) 
7.46 
(1.44)  25  1.96 
(1.73)* 
8.51 
(2.71) **  21 
60%~80%  1.60 
(-0.10) 
5.71 
(1.07)  12  1.45 
(-0.20) 
6.56 
(2.21) **  7 
80%~100% 1.63  -0.59  9  1.50  -0.19  16 
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